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Abstract 
 
The Problematic Application of Economic Discourse to the 
Creation and Transfer of Information 
 
Christopher Garland Johnson, M.S.Info.St. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Nathan Ensmenger 
 
In Citizen's United v. FEC (2010) and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. (2011), the 
Supreme Court of the United States passed down a pair of opinions which 
clearly show the weaknesses of economic discourse as applied to the creation 
and transfer of information, itself defined as speech the court’s opinion in 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001). Foucoult described economic discourse in his 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) as being particularly exclusive, both in terms 
of other discourse as well as to the potential participants in the discourse. This 
paper argues for the need to incorporate alternate modes of discourse that would 
provide a more complete understanding of the practical, social, ethical and legal 
parameters surrounding information's creation and transfer. 
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The Problem 
It is a popularly accepted truism that we now live in an “information 
economy.” It is an open question, however, whether this new, global information 
economy will ultimately be more kind to the poor and to other traditionally 
marginalized populations than the industrial economies that preceded it. 
“Information Policy” is understood for the purposes of this paper to be a 
government’s responses in legislation, litigation and enforcement to problems 
that surface during the creation and distribution of information. Of particular 
interest are the interactions involving both information, as the source of new 
power, and money, which in many cases represents the legacy of historical 
power.  
The aim of this project is to understand why certain arguments seem more 
successful in the realm of information policy even as other arguments might 
seem more compelling. To that end, I will examine two Supreme Court cases, one 
widely discussed and criticized, the other much less well known. I will then 
attempt to consider and summarize the explicit logic of the cases, as well as the 
implicit assumptions of the economic models on which the cases seem to 
depend. Next, I will appeal to discourse analysis for an understanding of why 
certain types of language and logic seem to dominate even when, in the view of 
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this observer, the discourse seems too limited to address the relevant concerns. 
Finally, some alternate ways of discussing the issues will be briefly considered. 
This paper should be regarded as a work in progress, as I attempt to create 
a sound understanding and an coherent intellectual space from which I may 
address information policy in relevant ways without necessarily conforming to 
the prevalent discourse. 
Case Studies 
CITIZENS UNITED 
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission that limiting political contributions by corporations or unions is the 
same as limiting speech because “[a]ll speakers, including individuals and the 
media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.  
The First Amendment protects the resulting speech …” (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010) 
The decision of the Court in Citizens United has been criticized often and 
publicly. (Abrams, 2010)  The President of the United States even condemned the 
decision in a State of the Union Address to the Joint Houses of Congress. 
(Obama, 2010) Relatively few Supreme Court cases are discussed as widely and 
as vehemently as Citizens United. One may assume from the public commentary 
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that the majority opinion was somehow alien to the average American's way of 
thinking, but the case was, in fact, only the most visible of cases where the 
Supreme Court addressed speech and money. 
SORRELL 
In a much less well known case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011), the 
Supreme Court refused to make any meaningful distinction between commercial 
speech and any other speech. The court repeatedly referred to marketing and 
data-mining for the purpose of marketing as protected expression and declared 
that any regulation of marketing practices was subject to the same strict scrutiny 
as a restriction on political speech. The specific matter at hand was whether the 
state of Vermont could prevent pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies from 
using doctors' prescription histories to target marketing efforts of specific high 
end pharmaceuticals to doctors who may be most likely to change their 
prescription-writing practice to include the newer, more expensive drugs. The 
state initially claimed a privacy interest, but since the law only limited use of the 
prescription histories for marketing purposes, the state was forced to argue that 
medical cost controls were the primary interest served by the law. Public health 
being a major component of any state budget, the state claimed a substantial 
interest. 
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The Court did not approve. In the majority opinion, marketing or any 
other type of commercial speech is just another type of content and the state may 
not regulate speech on the basis of content. The majority opinion only once 
mentioned the precedent set in Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service 
Commission (1980), and failed to apply the previously upheld “Hudson Rule.” 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court decided that commercial speech could be 
regulated in ways inappropriate to other protected speech so long as the state 
could demonstrate a substantial interest and the regulation in question satisfies 
that interest with as narrow a regulation as possible. Hudson further declared 
that commercial speech may not be protected under the First Amendment at all if 
the speech is misleading or does not refer to lawful activity.  Similar restrictions 
do not exist for political speech, so the Court had clearly made a distinction 
between commercial speech and other types of expression. The distinction made 
for commercial speech in Hudson was not overturned by the majority opinion of 
Sorrel, it was merely ignored.  
In Citizens United and Sorrell, the Supreme Court has created a 
problematic set of realities: commercial speech is just speech with a particular 
content, protected as dearly as political speech, and money contributed to fund 
the wide distribution of speech is equivalent to the speech itself. The problems of 
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undue influence of the vast pools of money available to some parties, or the 
potential drowning-out of the voices of under-funded citizenry were ignored in 
favor of a particular type of logic. The uncomfortable pairing of money and 
expression is inextricably linked to the application of a certain type of economic 
discourse to the creation and transfer of information, itself defined in Bartnicki v. 
Vopper (2001) as a speech act. 
The particular logic of these cases is based upon a choice of discourse and 
is not an inevitable feature of our culture or justice system.  
THE LOGIC 
The majority opinion in Citizens United does not contain the phrase 
"money is speech," nor does it contain any phrase easily interpreted as being 
equivalent. Rather, it contains a very logical type of argument with a precedent 
going back at least to the 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo. The First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech not only protects literal vocalizations but 
also mass market distributions of speech. Since those mass distributions cost 
money, preventing legitimate speakers from spending money is effectively an a 
priori limitation on speech itself: precisely the type of limitation the First 
Amendment was ostensibly written to prevent.  
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In Sorrell, the Supreme Court seems set the bar for a states "substantial 
interest" impossibly high. The opinion of the Court may be summarized "[The] 
State may not burden protected expression in order to tilt public debate in a 
preferred direction... The State’s interest in burdening detailers’ speech thus 
turns on nothing more than a difference of opinion." (Sorrell, 2011) This 
argument is very compelling when one imagines the state outlawing a particular 
class of political or religious speech. It is less compelling in the context of 
marketing. After all, any claim of misleading conduct by marketers will 
ultimately rest on a "difference of opinion" and the court did not overtly overturn 
the precedent of Hudson that the state may regulate misleading corporate 
speech. How did the Court fail to make the distinction between commercial and 
every other type of speech? 
On its face, the Court decided on behalf of the consumers’ interest. Citing 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, (1977), "A ‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of 
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political 
dialogue.’” (Sorrel, 2011)  If the value to the consumer is comparable to political 
speech, then surely the protections ought also to be the same. “Value to the 
consumer” in this context is an economic concept that is blind to the specific 
content or class of speech or to its social, cultural or moral value. 
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The Assumptions 
The application of this variety of distinctly western, free-market economic 
thought makes some assumptions that may prove untenable. Free market 
understandings of commerce presume the excludability, rivalry and 
transparency of the goods in question. (DeLong & Froomkin, 2000)  I will fist 
address the issue of rivalry and then discuss the conflict between excludability 
and transparency when one is considering information goods. I will then discuss 
the some additional problems with the economic models applied to information. 
RIVALRY 
Rivalry refers to the characteristic that if one person possesses an object, 
then another may not. If one person purchases a particular rivalrous good, such 
as a banana or an automobile, then no other person may acquire that particular 
instance of the good without depriving the purchaser of its use. The market 
value of a rivalrous good can be determined as the highest price a potential user 
is willing to pay for that instance of the good. Furthermore, the theft of a 
rivalrous good creates real and perceptible harm by actively diminishing the 
wealth of the victim.  
In a world where the cost of reproducing and distributing information is 
near zero, it is difficult to maintain that information goods have the characteristic 
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of being rivalrous. (DeLong, 14) In the words of Thomas Jefferson, ideas 
possessed the “peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because 
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine.” (Jefferson, 1813) Information goods 
on the Internet have this same characteristic replicability, as is evidenced by file 
sharing and open source software. 
In 2002, Jack Valenti, Chairman of the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) testified before the House Appropriations Committee 
concerning the threat of digital “piracy.” Valenti argued that every un-
authorized digital copy was directly comparable to the theft of a rivalrous good, 
and resulted in real economic losses equivalent to theft of the good at full market 
value. This real harm, according to Valenti, would surely ruin all the “content 
industries.” The Stop Piracy in NYC campaign, funded by the MPAA states, 
“Content theft robs U.S. workers of wages for residuals and pensions, too. $5 
billion so far.” (Stop Piracy in NYC, 2012) The Recording Industry Association of 
America claims that peer-to-peer file sharing has results in annual losses of 12.5 
billion dollars to the economy of the United States and the loss of 70,000 jobs. 
(RIAA, 2012)  
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File sharers disagree. Cenite et al (2009), researching file sharing in 
Singapore, found that many of the illegal downloads that occur in Asia are 
copies of products are not legally available in that market at all. (211-212) 
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, researching in the United States, found illegal 
music downloads to “have an effect on sales that is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero.” (2007, 1) File sharers may argue, then, that illegal downloads do not 
constitute the same kind of real and perceptible harm as the theft of a rivalrous 
good. There are still many ethical considerations surrounding a user’s gaining 
access to a creative work without compensating the creator, but economic 
discourse, with its assumptions of rivalry, is ill-suited to that discussion. 
The open-source software community is another example of a context that 
takes advantage of the non-rivalrous nature of information goods. Members of 
the open source community, rather than protecting their proprietary code as an 
economic good, provide the code for others to alter or improve as they see fit. 
Instead of market competition, open source coders participate in a cooperative 
effort to create sophisticated bodies of software that better serve everyone in the 
community. (Weber, 2004)  
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EXCLUDABILITY VS. RIVALRY 
The characteristics of excludability and transparency are, in the case of 
information goods, mutually exclusive. Excludability means that the possessor 
can prevent others from partaking, but transparency implies the free availability 
of information about the product. Goods in a physical marketplace may have 
both characteristics. A fishmonger may prevent a customer from taking a fish 
even as the customer gathers relevant information concerning its size, quality 
and freshness. If the fishmonger finds some way to obscure or hide the relevant 
information, then they will not be viewed as a trusted vendor and risk losing 
customers.   
When information is the product, the product cannot be both exclusive 
and transparent. The consumer’s access to information about an information 
product is necessarily and severely limited by any protections on the product 
itself. If a potential user is excluded from accessing a particular data set, then that 
user cannot meaningfully evaluate the data and must rely on trusted reports or 
reviewers. The more complete and useful the relevant reports and reviews are, 
the less excluded the user is from the data itself, as the report must contain useful 
information about the information.  
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Cenite found that one of the major motivations for the illegal 
downloading of entertainment goods is the sampling of the good before 
purchase. (2009, 212) In this case the excluding of the product by making 
downloads impossible would actually prevent sales as potential purchasers will 
not choose to buy products they know nothing about. So many entertainment 
goods are available that potential purchasers cannot make informed decisions 
without first having some access to the product. 
CONTEXT DIFFERENTIATION 
Information goods are also distinguished from commodities by their 
extreme differentiation according to context. Two ten dollar bills possessed by 
different people have the same market value. Crude oil of a particular grade 
from Canada has the same market value as crude of that grade that is pumped in 
Saudi Arabia. The same cannot be said for information. A data set derived from 
the internet search histories of an affluent demographic may have a very 
different use, and thus a different value, from the internet search histories of a 
demographic that might be less affluent. The same might be said for information 
on the activities of populations with different levels of political involvement. In 
these instances, some part of the value of the information is not contained in the 
data itself, but in the identities of the data’s subjects.    
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It may be acceptable to think of trading in commodity corn as being 
equivalent to trading money. The same may not be said for unique information 
products whose value is derived from the humanity of the subject or creator of 
the product. Nevertheless, in modern economic discourse, where value is 
assigned by the free market, this distinction is not possible. 
MONOPOLY OR CROWDING OUT 
The economic models being applied to information in Citizens United and 
Sorrell seem not to include any notion of the possibility of monopoly or 
crowding out. Discussions of the Freedom of Speech have included analogies to 
the “Marketplace of Ideas” since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s dissent in Abrams 
v. United States (1919). (Napoli, 1999) The Court opinions in Citizens United and 
Sorrell fail to address the possibility that the marketplace of ideas may be 
flooded by a few speakers able to outbid their competitors for the most powerful 
and wide distributions of speech. The particular economic discourse used in 
those cases seems to include the notion of an infinite marketplace, but the models 
failed to account for the limited attention of real human beings.  
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Choices of Discourse 
The choice to discuss the creation and transfer of information as an 
economic good necessarily excludes other ways of thinking. (Foucault, 1972)  
Litman, in her book, Digital Copyright, chronicles the long series of closed-door 
discussions on copyright policy that have informed current copyright law. (2001) 
She notes that consumers were consistently and conspicuously un-represented in 
those discussions. This is consistent with Foucault’s observation that “economic 
discourse has never been a common discourse.” (1972, 68) That is, economic 
discourse not only excludes other potential modes of discourse, it also severely 
limits the number of participants. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizen’s United has been criticized on 
many fronts. (Abrams, 2010) Foucault’s arguments on discourse suggest, 
however, that as long as that case’s critics fail to present persuasive counter-
arguments within the same economic discourse in which the opinion of the court 
is presented, they are left with the nearly impossible task of arguing across 
parallel, but mutually exclusive, discourses. 
Economic discourse on information (or pseudo-economic discourse, since 
it fails to conform to the assumptions or rigor of economics) is so tempting and 
so exclusive largely due to the appearance of objectivity and authority it creates. 
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The free market can quantify what would otherwise be intangible value. It is 
difficult to question the discourse without seeming to question the market itself, 
which in the United States represents a cultural and political heterodoxy. 
But economic discourse does not allow for some of the more interesting 
questions.  In particular, this type of economic discourse excludes discussions of 
ethical considerations other than crimes against property or discussions of any 
values information might possess separate from its quantifiable market value.  
Privacy that people expect but are not willing to pay for is not an economic good 
and has no economic value. In a world where enormous quantities of speech, or 
where the same speech on a continuous loop, may be bought as an economic 
good on the open market, to be distributed through the most effective and 
authoritative media, there is a non-trivial risk that less well funded speech will 
be drowned out. Underfunded speech will not lose in the fair “marketplace of 
ideas” but in a market distorted by economic power amassed though other 
means. Every citizen may be afforded the right to speak, but if money is 
equivalent to speech and its unlimited use is protected as speech, then none but 
the wealthiest citizen is afforded the guarantee to be heard. 
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Other ways of thinking 
Discourse on market economics is both powerful and useful, but it is not 
the only way to discuss the creation, exchange and use of information. 
INFORMATION AS A COMMONS 
 Some information is already regarded as existing within the information 
commons or the public domain. Since the United States adopted the Berne 
Convention in 1989, all expression fixed in a tangible medium are immediately 
considered property, and thus as economic goods. Prior to 1989, expressions that 
had not been specifically registered and marked as copyrighted entered the 
public domain and were not considered to be economic goods. This was the 
context for the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson, where commercial speech 
could be regulated, because the vast majority of “free” speech was not 
considered to be an economic good, while commercial speech was. Public 
information policy might in the future contain a greater awareness and 
allowance for newly created information to enter the public domain rather than 
the economic market. (Boyle, 2008) Information that enters the commons could 
not be so easily converted into money as information in the free market, thus 
creating an easy distinction between commercial expression and non-commercial 
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free speech, warranting certain restrictions as well as economic protections for 
the former.  
INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITHIN A GIFT ECONOMY 
Closely tied to the expansion of the public domain the idea of gift-
economies, where wealth is transferred through gifting rather than through 
commerce. (Mauss, 1925/2002) This much more closely models the actual practice 
of human speech, where one does not generally consider ones words as an 
economic good, but as a social exchange. Social expectations for reciprocity 
within gift economies may limit the application of these models to information 
transfer, which is often a unidirectional transaction, (Goulder, 1960) but many 
have used the notion of the gift economy as a model for the open source 
community, which creates tremendously valuable software and gives the code 
away, to be modified, enhanced and regifted by someone else (Weber, 2004, 
Geisler, 2006) and by Wikipedia, where experts and laypeople contribute their 
knowledge and expertise freely and collaboratively without any traditional 
economic motive. 
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INFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Finally, some information may be better regarded as an aspect of 
personhood rather than as an economic good. A person’s vital statistics, internet 
search history, school records, etc. may be tremendously valuable (at least in 
aggregate), but that value is derived from the personhood of the information’s 
subject, not the effort or creativity of the information’s collector. Information 
regarding these personal topics may be best informed by some meaningful 
discussion of privacy rights rather than through a discussion of the data as a 
product on the open market. (Nissenbaum, 2010, Solve, 2008) Many people 
would not be able to compete on the open market for data regarding their own 
person, even if they choose to. The average person is bound to lose the economic 
competition. In a discussion of intrinsic human rights, however, some control of 
personal data may be afforded to individuals despite their inability to pay. 
 Typical pseudo-economic discourse does not allow for a sensible 
discussion of information in any of these alternate contexts, as they all suggest 
value as derived from something strikingly different than a market evaluation of 
worth. A discourse which allows for these alternate perspectives on information 
would most likely result in a different logical conclusion than those at which the 
Supreme Court arrived in Sorrell and Citizen’s United.   
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Conclusion 
As information and information goods become progressively more 
important to the global culture and economy, it will become essential that 
discussions of information and information policy not be limited to one exclusive 
context or field of discourse. As long as the prevailing discourse in information 
policy is economic, then statements concerning human rights, justice and fairness 
of access as relates to information are meaningless.  (Foucault, 1972) That is, 
arguments to those ends may be proposed, and even widely agreed upon in 
some circles, but policy will continue to advance according to the prevailing 
economic logic, which itself has a strong tendency to bolster already existing 
power structures. 
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